Abstract-In distributed ad hoc sensor networks, scalable group key agreement protocol plays an important role. They are designed to provide a group of users with a shared secret key such that the users can securely communicate with each other over a public network. In most of previous group key agreement protocols, the number of messages sent by all users increases with the number of all participants. In this paper, a dynamic authenticated group key agreement protocol is presented using pairing for ad hoc networks. In Join algorithm, the number of transmitted messages does not increase with the number of all group members, which makes the protocol more practical. The protocol is provably secure. Its security is proved under Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. The protocol also provides many other security attributes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc sensor network is a special type of network in which a set of mobile nodes may form a temporary network. In ad hoc network, all devices are able to establish direct communication with other devices that are within its communication range, and there is no centralizing entity such as the access point. Therefore, designing group key agreement protocols for such networks is a big challenge to achieve secure communication due to host mobility and lack of infrastructure.
Up to now, several key agreement protocols have been proposed, most of which are extensions of the first twoparty key agreement protocol [1] proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 and the tripartite key agreement protocol proposed by Joux in [2] . The security properties of key agreement protocols have been extensively studied. Tan [3] extended key agreement protocols to multi-server environments. In 1982, Ingemarsson [4] proposed the first group key agreement protocol. But no formal security analysis appears in their work. Formal security analysis of group key agreement protocol first appears in Bression et al. 's protocol [5] . The security model they adpoted is based on the 2-party key exchange models [6] . Protocols [4] and [5] require O(n) rounds. Barua [7] attempted to extend Joux's tripartite protocol to multi-party one. Reddy proposed a group key agreement protocol in [8] under the employment of identity-based cryptosystem. There is no formal security analysis in [7] , [8] . Dutta et al. proposed a group key agreement with formal security analysis in [9] . However, protocols proposed in [7] - [9] require O(lgn) communication rounds. In 2003, Katz and Yung [10] proposed a scalable compiler which can transform any group key agreement protocol to an authenticated one and and they obtained a three-round authenticated group key agreement with formal security analysis by applying their compiler to protocol [11] . Protocols in [12] - [14] are more efficient since they require two rounds. Protocols in [15] , [16] require only one round to establish group session keys.
There are many two-party key agreement protocols [17] , [18] and group key agreement protocols for ad hoc networks. In ad hoc network, the users are usually mobile. The group member is not known in advance and the users may join and leave the group very frequently. In such scenarios, dynamic group key agreement protocols are required. Such schemes must ensure that the group session key updates upon group member changing such that subsequent session keys are protected from the leaving members and previous session keys are protected from the joining members. There are quite a number of dynamic group key agreement protocols. Bresson et al. improved the protocol [5] into dynamic group key agreement protocols in [19] , [20] . However, in Bresson et al.'s protocols, O(n) rounds are required in setup/join algorithms, so they are not suitable for ad hoc network. Protocols [21] and Dutta [22] require key trees to establish group session keys. In [23] , [24] , a ring structure among group members is considered. In such protocols, special ordering of the group members is required, which is not easily achieved in ad hoc networks. Since the mobile devices in ad hoc networks have limited resources and most cryptographic algorithms require expensive computations, the design of secure and efficient group key agreement protocols for ad hoc networks is one of the important problems. Protocol [25] , [26] are constant round group key agreement protocols for mobile ad hoc networks.
Our Contributions In this paper, an efficient dynamic group key agreement(DAGKA) protocol for ad hoc networks is proposed. It is provably secure. Its security is proved in random oracle model under Decision Bilinear Deffie-Hellman assumption. It provides forward security and resists key control attack. In the proposed protocol, constant rounds are required and the number of transmitted messages in Join algorithm increases only with the number of joining members. Therefore, it is suitable for ad hoc mobile networks.
II. PRELIMINARY AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we will review some basic facts related to the proposed protocol and describe the security model in which the security of the proposed protocol is proved. Throughout the paper, we assume that G 1 and G 2 are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order q , and the discrete logarithm problems in both G 1 and G 2 are intractable.
A. Notions
Admissible Bilinear Pairing: Admissible pairing is a mapê :
satisfying the following properties:
(1) Bilinear:
Non-degenerate:
Computable :
There exits a polynomial time algorithm to computeê(g 1 , g 2 )for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 1 . Modified weil pairing [27] and tate paring [28] 
BDH assumption means that any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A has negligible advantage in solving BDH problem,i.e. Adv BDH G1,G2,ê is negligible. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellma (DBDH) Problem DBDH problem in (G 1 , G 2 ,ê) is as follows: Given random P ∈ G 1 and aP, bP, cP, dP with a, b, c, d ∈ Z * q , distinguish between tuples of the form (P, aP, bP, cP,ê(P, P ) abc ) and (P, aP, bP, cP,ê(P, P ) d ). Formally, given a tuple (P, aP, bP, cP, dP ), where P ∈
q , we say that the advantage of an algorithm A in solving DBDH problem is Adv
,ê,A } DBDH assumption means that any PPT algorithm A has negligible advantage in solving DBDH problem, i.e. Adv DBDH G1,G2,ê is negligible.
B. Security Model
In the model, there exists an adversary A which is assumed to control the network completely. The adversary is not a group member. The adversary may delay, replay, modify, interleave, delete or redirect messages. At any time, the adversary can make the following queries:
Send(m): This query allows the adversary to make the user run the protocol normally. This query returns to the adversary the result that an honest user would generate if the message m is sent according to the protocol rules.
Join(U, J) : This query models the insertion of a set of users in J in the current group U. The output of this query is the transcript generated by the invocation of algorithm Join(U, J). This query is initiated by a Send query.
Leave(U, L) : This query models the removal of users in L from the current group U. It returns the transcript generated by the invocation of algorithm Leave(U, L). This query must be initiated by a Send query.
Reveal (
This query models the attacks resulting in the session key being revealed. It is available to the adversary if the oracle ∏ i u has accepted (see below). The session key is output to the adversary.
Corrupt(ID u ): This query outputs the long-term private key of user u to the adversary. But it does not output any internal data of user u.
Test( ∏ i u ): A random bit b is generated. If b=1, the session key is returned. Otherwise a random value in the session key space is returned. T est query can be performed only once against an oracle which is fresh (see below).
An oracle may be in one of the following states: Accepted: The oracle decides to accept the session key after receiving properly formatted messages.
Rejected: The oracle aborts the run of the protocol. Opened: A Reveal query has been performed against the oracle for its last run of the protocol. 
C. Security Notions
∏ j v are partnered. Definition of Security The security of a protocol is defined by the following game played between the adversary and an infinite set of instances for ID i ∈ U.
(1) Firstly, long-term keys are assigned to each user in the initialization phase. (2) Then, the adversary will interact with the oracles through queries above and get answers from the corresponding oracles. (3) At some point, the adversary decides to make a T est query to a fresh oracle. 
III. PROTOCOL
In this section, we will propose an authenticated group key agreement protocol for ad hoc networks. Each user i holds a pair of signature/verification key (SK i , P K i ). Σ = (K, S, V) is a CMA-secure signature scheme. In order to explain our protocol, we firstly describe the following algorithm to generate system parameters Generation: Given a security parameter k ∈ Z + , the algorithm works as follows:
On input k, output a prime q, two groups G 1 , G 2 of order q, an admissible bilinear mapê:
q be one-way hash functions with l ≥| q |. The group session key space belongs to {0, 1} l . We also assume that the member in a group with the maximum index is the group leader.
The protocol is as follows: Setup Let U 0 be an initial group with
Round 2 User n checks the signatures δ i on y i ∥ k i using pk i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1). If one of the verifications fails, it aborts the protocol. Otherwise, it chooses random r n ∈ Z * q , k n ∈ {0, 1} l and computes Post Computation User i(1 ≤ i ≤ n) computes and stores x = H 1 (sk).
Join Let U v−1 = {u 1 , u 2 , ..., u n } be the current group, J = {u n+1 , u n+2 , ..., u n+m } be the set of users who will join the group {u 1 
The protocol is as follows: Round 1 User n randomly chooses new k n ∈ {0, 1} l , sets r n = x, computes y n = g x and the signature δ n on y n ∥ k n using sk n . Then it broadcasts δ n ∥ y
rn+i . Then he computes the signature δ n+i on y n+i ∥k n+i and broadcasts δ n+i ∥y n+i ∥k n+i .
Round 2 User n + m first verifies the signatures δ n+i on y n+i ∥ k n+i using pk n+i (0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1). If one of the verifications fails, it aborts the protocol. Otherwise, he chooses random r n+m ∈ Z * q , k n+m ∈ {0, 1} l and Post Computation All users compute and store x = H 1 (sk).
Leave Without loss of generality, we assume that
.., u n } is the current group and that L = {u m+1 , u m+2 , ..., u n } is the set of leaving users.
Round 2 User m verifies the signatures δ i on y i ∥k i using pk i (1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1). If one of the verifications fails, it aborts the protocol. Otherwise, it chooses random r m ∈ Z * q , k m ∈ {0, 1} l and computes Post Computation Each user computes and stores x = H 1 (sk) .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, the security of the proposed protocol is proved under DBDH assumption. In addition, the protocol is analyzed to provide other security attributes a group key agreement protocol should achieve.
Theorem 4.1. The proposed protocol is secure against active adversary. Concretely,
where q s is the number of Send queries, q h is the number of queries to hash oracle H and n is the number of group members.
Proof: In order to simulate the attack of the adversary, we define a sequence of games:
In each game, the adversary executes T est query and gets a challenge session key sk b . Succ i denotes the event that A ′ s guessing bit b ′ is equal to b in game G i . Each G i is simulated as follows:
Game G 0 : This game is equal to the real protocol in which all users are assigned a pair of valid sign/verification keys and generate messages honestly. It follows that
Game G 1 : In this game, we consider an event F orge in which the adversary asks for a Send(m, δ i ) query with V (pk ui , m, δ i )=1. The message m was not previously used and no Corrupt(u i ) query has ever been executed. Using the adversary A, we can construct an algorithm F that forges a signature as follows: Given a public key pk, F sets pk u = pk with u being a random user of group U v . The public key and private key of other users are generated honestly by F . F answers all oracle queries of A by executing the protocol itself. It obtains the necessary signatures with respect to pk u from its signing oracle. Thus the simulation of F for the adversary is perfect. If the adversary ever outputs a new valid message /signature pair with respect to pk u , F outputs this pair as a forgery. The probability that F successfully forges a signature is 
Game G 3 : This game differs from the previous one in how Send queries in test session are answered.
Given an instance of BDH problem (1) to (6), we obtain the desired results.
In the following, we will consider some other security attributes that are often used to judge key agreement protocols.
Forward Security: A protocol is said to provide forward security if compromise of any user's private key does not allow the adversary to discover any past session keys.
In the proposed protocol, the long-term private key is not used for hiding session key but for authentication. Thus leakage of any user's long-term private key does not reveal anything about previous session keys.
No Key Control: A key agreement protocol is said to resist key control attack if no one can predetermine the final session key.
In the proposed protocol, the final session key is of the form
. Key control can be guaranteed by the check process H(k n ∥ ID v ) = U n and one way of hash function H. No one can force the full session key to be a predicted value, because every one has an input into the key and no one can control it. However, the user can set some bits of the agreed session key by carefully selecting his contribution k i until he achieves the desired result. Fortunately, it is not possible for a user to set a large number of bits in a reasonable time frame. It is advisable for all users to run the protocol in a short time.
V. PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON
We now compare our protocol with another dynamic group key agreement protocol [25] which is suitable for ad hoc networks. We will use the flowing notations:
Round : The total number of rounds. M ul : The total number of modular multiplications . M size : The maximum number of messages sent by per user.
P/E : The total number of pairing computations or exponentiations. As shown above, the proposed protocol is more efficient than that in [25] . Moreover, the number of transmitted messages in Join algorithm does not increase with the number of all members, which greatly improves the entire efficiency of the protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a dynamic authenticated group key agreement protocol is presented for ad hoc networks. Its security is proved in random oracle model under DBDH assumption. The leaving members can get no information about subsequent session keys and joining members can get no information about previous session keys. It also provides forwards security and resists key control attack. Furthermore, in the proposed protocol, the number of messages transmitted in Join algorithm only increases with the number of increasing members, which makes the protocol more practical.
